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Abstract This paper aims to explain the observation (not previously reported) that
-wa obviates Negative Island effects in Japanese degree questions. The explanation
offered ties this obviation to epistemic implications associated with -wa, deriving
the latter in a (Neo-)Gricean framework. The explanation relies on Fox & Hackl’s
(2006) view that Negative Islands in degree questions are due to the necessary
failure of a Maximality Presupposition, but it abandons their proposal that such
presuppositions must be calculated under the assumption that scales of degrees are
invariably dense.
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1 Introduction
In English degree questions, wh-movement usually cannot cross negation (e.g.
Obenauer 1984, Rizzi 1990). This so-called Negative Island effect is illustrated by
the acceptability contrast between (1) and (2).
(1) How long did Taro stay in Germany?
(2) * How long did Taro not stay in Germany?
As shown in (3) and (4), the same contrast holds in Japanese. There the pattern
is extended by the fact that Negative Islands are obviated by -wa: (5) shows that
appending -wa to the gradable predicate nagaku ‘long’ in (4) restores acceptability.1,2
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1 While the semantics and pragmatics of -wa is a classic topic in Japanese linguistics, we are not aware
of any previous description of the particle’s potential to obviate Negative Island violations.
2 We are hard pressed to think of a good English translation of (5). What is clear is that true answers to
(5) specify durations that exceed the actual length of Taro’s stay in Germany.
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(3) Taro-wa
Taro-TOP
doitu-ni
Germany-in
doredake
how
nagaku
long
taizaisimasi-ta
stay-PAST
ka?
Q
‘How long did Taro stay in Germany?’
(4) * Taro-wa
Taro-TOP
doitu-ni
Germany-in
doredake
how
nagaku
long
taizaisimas-en-desi-ta
stay-not-COP-PAST
ka?
Q
(5) Taro-wa
Taro-TOP
doitu-ni
Germany-in
doredake
how
nagaku-wa
long-WA
taizaisimas-en-desi-ta
stay-not-COP-PAST
ka?
Q
We will in the following refer to occurrences of -wa in degree questions and
their answers as degree related. As reflected in the translations in (6) and (7), the
meaning contribution of degree related -wa is similar to that of English at least or
minimally (e.g. Geurts & Nouwen 2007; Büring 2008; Nouwen 2010).
(6) Taro-wa
Taro-TOP
doitu-ni
Germany-in
doredake
how
nagaku-wa
long-WA
taizaisimasi-ta
stay-PAST
ka?
Q
‘How long, minimally, did Taro stay in Germany?’
(7) Taro-wa
Taro-TOP
doitu-ni
Germany-in
too-ka(-kan)-wa
ten-day-for-WA
taizaisimasi-ta.
stay-PAST
‘Taro stayed in Germany for at least ten days.’
In particular, (7) shares with its English translation the implication stated in (8),
where P marks epistemic possibility. So by uttering (7) a speaker conveys that, as far
as she knows, the duration of Taro’s stay in Germany may have exceeded ten days.
(8) P [Taro stayed in Germany for more than 10 days]
It seems natural to hypothesize a close connection between epistemic possibility
implications contributed degree related -wa and its potential to obviate Negative
Islands. Specifically, one might hope that the proper analysis of possibility impli-
cations derives Negative Island obviation for free. This is indeed the line of attack
we will take in this paper. In doing so, we adopt the view that Negative Islands are
due to necessary failure of a Maximality Presupposition (Fox & Hackl 2006; Fox
2007b; Abrusán 2007; Abrusán & Spector 2011), and we explore the possibility that
-wa obviates Negative Islands by virtue of rendering a presupposition satisfiable that
would otherwise be contradictory.
2 Hamblin sets, Maximization Failure, and scale density
We begin by reviewing Fox & Hackl’s (2006) analysis of Negative Islands in degree
questions. Adopting a standard approach to wh-interrogatives (e.g. Karttunen 1977),
Fox & Hackl assume that in English degree questions, wh-movement derives a
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property of degrees, which in turn determines a so-called Hamblin set (Hamblin
1973), a set of propositions containing possible answers to the question. The
propositions in the Hamblin set result from applying the relevant property to the
entities in the domain of the wh-phrase. So in (1), wh-movement derives the degree
property in (9a), yielding the Hamblin set in (9b).
(9) a. λd : d is a duration. that Taro stayed d long in Germany
b. {that Taro stayed d long in Germany: d is a duration}
In (9), d long is to be read as d long or longer. This reading is guaranteed to be
derived under the standard view that gradable predicates have an at least semantics,
so that long relates an event not only to its exact duration, but to all shorter durations
as well.
Parallel to (1) and (9), the negative degree question in (2) will be associated with
the degree property in (10a) and the Hamblin set in (10b).
(10) a. λd : d is a duration. that Taro did not stay d long in Germany
b. {that Taro did not stay d long in Germany: d is a duration}
Fox & Hackl (2006) suggest that negative degree questions like (2) are ungrammati-
cal by virtue of being semantically ill-formed. Their account adopts the assumption
about question interpretation in (11), and the condition on acceptability in (12). The
idea, of course, is that (1) but not (2) meets the Maximality Condition.
(11) Maximality Presupposition (Dayal 1996)
A question presupposes that its Hamblin set has a maximally informative true
element, i.e. a true proposition that entails all the other true propositions in
the set.
(12) Maximality Condition
The Maximality Presupposition of a question must be satisfiable, i.e. non-
contradictory.
It is indeed evident that (1) satisfies this condition. The degree property in (9a) is
upward scalar, mapping higher degrees to stronger propositions than lower degrees.3
The set of degrees that (9a) describes moreover has a maximum: if the exact length
of Taro’s stay in Germany is, say, ten days, then ten days is the maximal duration that
(9a) maps to a true proposition, and the proposition that Taro stayed for ten days (or
longer) is the most informative true element of (9b). The Maximality Presupposition
is then satisfied and so the Maximality Condition is met.
3 We take the terms upward scalar and downward scalar from Abrusán & Spector (2011).
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The case of (2) is somewhat less straightforward. The degree property in (10a)
is downward scalar, mapping lower degrees to stronger propositions than higher
degrees. Suppose now that length of stay in Germany is counted in full days only.
In that case, the set of degrees that (10a) describes has a minimum: if the length of
Taro’s stay is exactly ten days, then eleven days will be the minimal duration that
(10a) maps to a true proposition, and the proposition that Taro did not stay for eleven
days (or longer) is the most informative true element of (10b). It would appear, then,
that the Maximality Presupposition is satisfied and that the Maximality Condition is
again met.
According to Fox & Hackl (2006), however, this appearance is misleading. They
suggest that the Maximality Condition is checked by a contextually blind Deductive
System, which indiscriminately treats all scales of degrees as dense, hence never
limits itself to discrete units of measurement such as full days. In that case, the set
described by the degree property in (10a) does not in fact have a minimum and so
(10b) does not have a most informative true member. If the length of Taro’s stay is r,
then (10a) describes all durations longer than r, mapping all of them to true members
of (10b). But density will prevent any of them from being the most informative, and
so (2) violates the Maximality Condition after all. In the terms of Fox (2007b), (2)
suffers from Maximization Failure.
A working assumption in our analysis of -wa is that in Japanese, just like in
English, wh-movement in degree questions derives degree properties that determine
Hamblin sets. So we will take (3) and (4) above to share with their English coun-
terparts interpretations like (9) and (10), respectively.4 Adopting Fox & Hackl’s
approach to Negative Islands in degree questions, we are then led straightforwardly to
the hypothesis that -wa obviates Negative Islands by virtue of averting the derivation
of Hamblin sets that would violate the Maximality Condition.
In the following, we will present and evaluate two such accounts of Negative
Island obviation by -wa. Both accounts attempt to link the circumvention of Maxi-
mization Failure to the presence of epistemic implications. The accounts differ in
how this is achieved and in how the implications in question are derived.
3 Wa as a modal operator?
3.1 Modal implications in the semantics
As mentioned in section 1, degree related -wa is similar in meaning to English at
least and minimally. In their study of at least, Geurts & Nouwen (2007) report that
it gives rise to the very same possibility implications described above for -wa. In
fact, Geurts & Nouwen propose that the meaning of at least involves both possibility
4 In our final analysis in section 4, however, we will read d long in (9) and (10) as exactly d long.
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and necessity. In their view, the English translation for (7) has the meaning in (13),
where P and N are epistemic possibility and necessity operators, respectively.
(13) N [Taro stayed in Germany for ten days or more] &
P ∃d[d > ten days & Taro stayed d long in Germany]
Specifically, they view (13) as the truth conditional meaning of the sentence in
question, and accordingly propose that at least is a modal operator, introducing
modal quantification at the truth conditional level through its lexical meaning.
We will now investigate, although ultimately reject, the application of such an
analysis to -wa. To spell out a concrete account, suppose degree related -wa is a
genuine degree operator: it combines with a degree-denoting expression, such as
a measure phrase, to form a generalized quantifier over degrees. This leads us to
assigning (7) a logical form like (14).5
(14) [ten days wa] λd[Taro in Germany [d nagaku] stayed]
In (14), the degree phrase headed by -wa has moved covertly. This movement
introduces lambda abstraction, creating a derived degree predicate. We take the
variable abstracted over to be the degree argument of the gradable predicate nagaku
‘long’, which remains unpronounced, as indicated by the strikeout. We assume that
nagaku relates events to durations under an at least semantics, as shown in (15). The
lambda abstract in (14) then describes (for any given possible world) all durations
up to the length of Taro’s past stay in Germany. The truth conditions in (13) can then
be derived straightforwardly by assigning -wa the denotation in (16), where N and P
are the obvious functors of type (st)t.
(15) JnagakuK = λd.λe.λw. e′s duration in w≥ d
(16) JwaK= λdd.λ f d(st).N f (d)&Pλw.∃d′[d′ > d& f (d′)(w)]
3.2 Modal obviation
The particular analysis just presented is designed to tie obviation by -wa to a phe-
nomenon that Fox & Hackl (2006) refer to as modal obviation: Fox & Hackl observe
that English negative degree questions are acceptable if negation is interpreted in the
immediate scope of a necessity operator. This is illustrated by the contrast between
(17) (which repeats (2)) and (18), where negation appears embedded under the
epistemic necessity modal sure.
(17) * How long did Taro not stay in Germany?
5 For readability, we use English vocabulary in logical forms, limiting Japanese to those expressions
whose interpretation is under discussion.
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(18) How long are you sure Taro did not stay in Germany?
It turns out that this contrast is predicted under Fox & Hackl’s (2006) account.
The degree properties associated with (17) and (18) are shown in (19) (which repeats
(10a)) and (20), respectively.
(19) λd: d is a duration. that Taro did not stay d long in Germany
(20) λd: d is a duration. that N [Taro did not stay d long in Germany]
Recall that (19) is downward scalar, mapping lower degrees to stronger propositions
than higher degrees. We have seen that the Maximality Condition excludes (17)
because under the density assumption, the set described by (19) cannot have a
minimum: there cannot be a shortest duration exceeding Taro’s actual length of stay.
The property in (20) is downward scalar as well. In contrast to (19), however, the
density assumption does not prevent the set it describes from having a minimum.
Even under the density assumption, there is nothing logically inconsistent about a
speaker being certain, for example, that Taro did not stay for ten days or more, while
not being able to exclude any shorter durations of stay. So (18) is correctly predicted
to pass the Maximality Condition.
3.3 Obviation by -wa as modal obviation
As illustrated by the contrast between (4) above and (21), modal obviation is also
attested in Japanese. So it seems that Fox & Hackl’s (2006) account of modal
obviation can be applied to the Japanese case without modification.
(21) [Taro-ga
Taro-NOM
doitu-ni
Germany-in
doredake
how
nagaku
long
taizaisi-nakat-ta
stay-not-PAST
koto-ga]
KOTO-nom
kakuzitu-desu
certain-cop
ka?
Q
‘How long are you sure that Taro did not stay in Germany?’
As disclosed earlier, the modal analysis of -wa presented above is designed to
make fall out Negative Island obviation by -wa as a case of modal obviation. Let
us return, then, to the crucial example in (5) above. Consider the logical form for
(5) shown in (22). It contains two lambda abstracts, the lower one introduced by
movement of the degree phrase headed by -wa across negation, and the higher one
by wh-movement from within that degree phrase.
(22) how λd′[ [d′ wa] λd[ [Taro in Germany [d nagaku] stayed] not ] ]
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Assuming that the moved wh-expression is semantically vacuous, (22) denotes the
degree property in (23). It turns out that (23) can be simplified to (20) above by
omitting the second conjunct in the value description (since the second conjunct is
already entailed by the first).
(23) λd : d is a duration. that N [Taro did not stay d long in Germany] &
P∃d′[d′ > d & Taro did not stay d′ long in Germany]
As a consequence, (5) is predicted to pass the Maximality Condition in the same
way as the more transparently modalized case in (21). Obviation by -wa falls out as
an instance of modal obviation.
3.4 Objections
The account of possibility implications and obviation by -wa presented above can be
questioned on a number of grounds. We will focus here on two objections that are
independent of the compositional particulars of the analysis offered, in particular the
assumption that degree related -wa is a degree operator that can take clausal scope.
One potentially disappointing feature of the account is that it does not in fact
derive obviation by -wa from the same source as possibility implications. Obviation
is attributed to a (meta-language) necessity operator that is posited in tandem with
the operator responsible for possibility implications, but actually independent of
it. The problem is that we have no independent evidence for the presence of this
necessity operator. Our suggestion that (7) has the truth conditions in (13) may be
consistent with speaker intuitions. However, the truth conditions in (24), where the
necessity operator has been omitted, admittedly are no less plausible.
(24) Taro stayed in Germany for ten days or more &
P∃d[d > ten days & Taro stayed d long in Germany]
Geurts & Nouwen (2007), whose analysis of at least provides the model for our
modal analysis, acknowledge that their proposal to let at least introduce necessity
into truth conditions is motivated by theoretical considerations, not by intuitions on
the meaning of simple at least sentences such as the translation of (7). Unfortunately,
we believe that those theoretical considerations do not extend to the case of -wa,
and so we have to concede that the modal analysis presented falls short of deriving
obviation from independently attested properties of -wa.6
6 In Geurts & Nouwen 2007, the necessity operator is posited mainly in order to feed a process of
modal concord; but the need of such a process has been questioned in Büring 2008 and Nouwen
2010. Geurts & Nouwen also motivate the necessity operator with a symmetry argument referring to
at least’s negative partner at most; but Japanese -wa lacks such a partner.
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Apart from lacking explanatory force, the modal analysis also fails to characterize
possibility implications correctly in the general case. Specifically, the modal -wa that
we have proposed does not always interact in the intended way with other operators
in the sentence. Take (25), where a universal quantifier replaces the referential
subject in (7).
(25) Daremo-ga
everyone-NOM
doitu-ni
Germany-in
too-ka(-kan)-wa
ten-day-for-WA
taizaisimasi-ta.
stay-PAST
‘Everyone stayed in Germany for at least ten days.’
There are two logical forms to consider for (25): -wa may scope below or above
the subject quantifier, as in (26a) and (26b), respectively.
(26) a. everyone λx[ [ten days wa] λd[x in Germany [d nagaku] stayed ] ]
b. [ten days wa] λd[everyone λx[x in Germany [d nagaku] stayed ] ]
Let us now consider a context where the domain of the universal quantifier is fixed
to a salient set of individuals, say, {Taro, Jiro, Saburo}. Under the modal account of
-wa, the logical form (26a), where the universal subject scopes wide, has a possibility
implication for each of these individuals, so (26a) entails each of the statements in
(27). (26b) is stronger than (26a) (assuming a fixed domain for the universal), so it
too entails that each of the propositions in (27) is true.
(27) a. P [Taro stayed in Germany for more than 10 days]
b. P [Jiro stayed in Germany for more than 10 days]
c. P [Saburo stayed in Germany for more than 10 days]
Consider now a situation where a speaker takes the exact durations of stay in
Germany to be as shown in (28). In this situation, each of the necessity statements
in (29) is true. Since (27a) and (29a) are inconsistent, it is therefore predicted that
(25) cannot be a suitable way of describing the information presented in (28).
(28) a. Taro: 10 days
b. Jiro: 11 days
c. Saburo: 12 days
(29) a. N [Taro stayed in Germany for exactly 10 days]
b. N [Jiro stayed in Germany for exactly 11 days]
c. N [Saburo stayed in Germany for exactly 12 days]
But this prediction is incorrect. Sentence (25) can in fact be used as a true and
appropriate characterization of the information presented in (28). In this case, then,
the truth conditions derived by the modal account are clearly too strong.
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4 Wa as a scale aligner
We are back to the question how sentence (7) comes to be associated with the
possibility implication in (8). Having abandoned an analysis that builds modality into
the lexical meaning of -wa, we will in section 4.1 pursue the option that possibility
implications have their source in Gricean reasoning and the (quantity) implicatures
it generates. In section 4.2, we describe what we call the scale alignment analysis of
degree related -wa, which extends the Gricean account of possibility implications
into an analysis of Negative Island obviation by -wa.
Importantly, the scale alignment analysis does not depend on Fox & Hackl’s
(2006) assumption that, for the purposes of the Maximality Condition, scales of
measurement are invariably dense. In fact, it depends on the assumption that the
Maximality Condition always makes use of, and if necessary accommodates, discrete
units of measurement.7
4.1 A Gricean route to possibility implications
4.1.1 Possibility implications via quantity implicatures
According to the standard (Neo-)Gricean recipe for quantity implicatures spelled
out in, e.g., Sauerland 2004, Fox 2007a, and Geurts to appear, an utterance of
a sentence expressing a proposition p invites the listener to infer that relevant
alternative propositions entailing p are not epistemic necessities, that is, may be false
as far as the speaker’s evidence goes.
Consider the case of (7). To begin, assuming an at least interpretation for the
measure phrase, we take the sentence to express the non-modalized proposition
enclosed by square brackets in (30). The parenthesized operator N indicates that this
proposition is an epistemic necessity for a cooperative speaker who asserts (7).8
(30) (N) [Taro stayed in Germany for 10 days or more] [ASN (7)]
Now suppose that (31a), where exactly replaces or more, and which entails the
bracketed proposition in (30), is a relevant alternative. The standard recipe then
derives the quantity implicature in (31b), a primary implicature in the terminology
of Sauerland (2004).9 Note that the conjunction of (30) and (31b) entails (8), the
7 Abrusán & Spector (2011) make a similar point in their analysis of Negative Islands in English degree
questions, arguing that the density assumption can be dispensed with under an analysis of degree
questions that posits abstractions over intervals of degrees.
8 We write ASN (n) to label asserted content associated with sentence (n).
9 We write ALT (n) to label a proposition that is assumed to be an alternative to the proposition
expressed by sentence (n); and we write PIM (n) to label a primary implicature derived for an
utterance of (n).
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possibility implication we are after.
(31) a. Taro stayed in Germany for exactly 10 days [ALT1 (7)]
b. ¬ N [Taro stayed in Germany for exactly 10 days] [PIM1 (7)]
Let us now revisit the problematic example in (25). Its asserted content is
expected to be as in (32), and the stronger alternative proposition in (33a), if relevant,
will yield the primary implicature in (33b).
(32) (N) [everyone stayed in Germany for 10 days or more] [ASN (25)]
(33) a. everyone stayed in Germany for exactly 10 days [ALT1 (25)]
b. ¬ N [everyone stayed in Germany for exactly 10 days] [PIM1 (25)]
The conjunction of (32) and (33b) (merely) entails (34) below. This possibility
implication is in accordance with intuitions. In particular, it is consistent with the
observation about (25) reported in section 3.4. Imagine again a context fixing the
quantifier domain to {Taro, Jiro, Saburo}. (34) is then consistent with the speaker’s
commitment to the information in (28): while under the modal account in section 3,
(25) entails that each of the statements in (27) is true, under the implicature account
(25) merely implies that one of them is true. This weaker condition is indeed met in
(28), where both Jiro and Saburo are listed as staying for more then ten days.
(34) P [someone stayed in Germany for more than 10 days]
The implicature account of possibility implications, then, seems to apply to
universally quantified -wa sentences in the intended way. The problem encountered
in the modal account does not arise.
4.1.2 Ignorance implications
It is time for us to note that the possibility implication in (8) does not exhaust the
epistemic implications perceived to be associated with (7). The sentence actually
suggests that the speaker has no (conclusive) opinion as to the duration of Taro’s stay
in Germany beyond her commitment to the assumed truth conditional content of (7).
In other words, (7) suggests that the speaker is ignorant as to whether Taro stayed
for exactly ten days and (therefore) is equally ignorant as to whether he stayed for
more than ten days.
In general, ignorance implications have the form ¬[N p] ∧ ¬N[¬ p] or, equiv-
alently, ¬[N p] ∧ P p. Under the standard recipe for quantity implicatures, the
ignorance implications associated with (7) suggest that we have to recognize a second
alternative proposition, viz. (35a), which also entails the bracketed proposition in
(30). Assuming (35a) is relevant, the standard recipe derives the additional primary
implicature in (35b).
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(35) a. Taro stayed in Germany for more than 10 days [ALT2 (7)]
b. ¬ N [Taro stayed in Germany for more than 10 days] [PIM2 (7)]
Together with (30), (35b) entails a second possibility implication, viz. (36). Note
that the two ignorance implications described above are now accounted for: the
conjunction of (35b) with (8) and the conjunction of (31b) with (36).
(36) P [Taro stayed in Germany for exactly 10 days]
If (35a) is considered a second alternative to the asserted content of (7), then
presumably (37a) must be considered a second alternative to the asserted content
of (25). Assuming this alternative is relevant, the standard recipe will derive the
additional primary implicature in (37b). And in conjunction with the asserted content
in (32), (37b) entails the second possibility implication in (38).
(37) a. everyone stayed in Germany for more than 10 days [ALT2 (25)]
b. ¬ N [everyone stayed in Germany for more than 10 days] [PIM2 (25)]
(38) P [someone stayed in Germany for exactly 10 days]
What is interesting is that, in this case, no ignorance implication is derived, as
the conjunction of asserted content and primary implicatures has no such entailment.
Specifically, this conjunction is consistent with (39a) and (39b), that is, with the
speaker’s being certain that not everyone stayed for exactly ten days and that not
everyone stayed for more than ten days, either.10
(39) a. N ¬[everyone stayed in Germany for exactly 10 days] [SIM1 (25)]
b. N ¬[everyone stayed in Germany for more than 10 days] [SIM2 (25)]
This prediction is again correct. This is clear from our observation in section 3.4
that sentence (25) can be used by a cooperative speaker to characterize the scenario
in (28), where someone stays for more than ten days, and someone stays for exactly
ten days.
4.1.3 Secondary implicatures
According to the standard recipe, a primary implicature can under certain circum-
stances be strengthened to what Sauerland (2004) calls a secondary implicature. If a
listener, having arrived at the primary implicature ¬ [N p], takes the speaker to have
a (conclusive) opinion as to the truth value of p, hence assumes [N p] ∨ N [¬ p], the
listener will arrive at the secondary implicature N[¬ p].
10 In (39), SIM stands for secondary implicature. We will introduce this notion momentarily.
712
Obviation by wa
In the case at hand, suppose the speaker is known to be reporting from a list
specifying everyone’s exact duration of stay in Germany. In that case, the speaker
will be assumed to have an opinion as to whether or not everyone stayed for exactly
ten days, and also whether or not everyone stayed for more than ten days. It is then
predicted that (33b) and (37b) are strengthened to (39a) and (39b), respectively.
This, too, is correct. In the relevant type of scenario, (25) will indeed be taken to
imply the statements in (39a) and (39b), rather than merely being consistent with
them.
It may appear at first sight that similar secondary implicatures, viz. the statements
shown in (40), can be derived for (7). However, we have already seen that in the
case of (7), the asserted content and primary implicatures jointly imply that the
speaker has no (conclusive) opinion as to whether she will stay for exactly ten
days or whether she will stay for more than ten days. Obviously, these ignorance
implications are inconsistent with the potential secondary implicatures in (40).
(40) a. N ¬[Taro stayed in Germany for exactly 10 days] [*SIM1 (7)]
b. N ¬[Taro stayed in Germany for more than 10 days] [*SIM2 (7)]
According to a principle articulated in Sauerland 2004, primary implicatures are not
strengthened to secondary implicatures if this strengthening leads to inconsistency
with the assertion and the primary implicatures. If so, it follows correctly that the
potential implicatures in (40) will not actually enter the interpretation of (7).
4.1.4 Wa, at least, and disjunction
We pause briefly to comment on how the implicature account of -wa presented
above relates to proposals in recent literature. Readers familiar with Sauerland 2004
will have been struck by the resemblance of our implicature account to Sauerland’s
treatment of disjunction. In fact, Sauerland’s analysis generates exactly the same
pattern of implications for (41a) and (41b) that we have derived for (7) and (25),
respectively.
(41) a. Taro stayed in Germany for [exactly ten days] or [for more than ten days].
b. Everyone stayed in Germany for [exactly ten days] or [for more than ten
days].
Building on Sauerland’s proposal, Büring (2008) moreover posits a tight connec-
tion between disjunction and at least. In Büring’s account, (42a) and (42b) below
are treated as short for (41a) and (41b), respectively, in the sense that each at least
sentence shares both truth conditions and quantity implicatures with its disjunctive
paraphrase.
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(42) a. Taro stayed in Germany for at least ten days.
b. Everyone stayed in Germany for at least ten days.
Sauerland (2004) does not actually consider examples analogous to (25). But
Fox (2007a) discusses a contrast in English disjunctions that seems analogous to the
one between (7) and (25): while John talked to Mary or Sue conveys the speaker’s
ignorance as to the truth value of each disjunct, no parallel ignorance implication
is associated with Everyone talked to Mary or Sue, which instead suggests that the
speaker takes neither Mary nor Sue to have been talked to by everyone. Fox notes
that this contrast is indeed predicted under Sauerland’s analysis.
Büring (2008) does not consider cases exactly like (42b), but does discuss
examples with universal modals, such as You are required to stay for at least ten
days, which make much the same point under his account. Nouwen (2010), on
the other hand, offers an analysis of at least under universal modals that does not
obviously extend to cases like (42b). For details, the reader is referred to the works
cited.
4.2 Wa as a scale aligner
Like all (Neo-)Gricean explanations, the implicature account given above depends
on specific assumptions about what counts as an alternative proposition. Actually,
it is generally assumed that a theory of alternatives must characterize alternative
utterances, or their logical forms, rather than propositions per se.
We will now present such a theory of alternatives under which adding degree re-
lated -wa leads from a set of semantically unrelated alternative propositions to a set of
propositions ordered by (or, aligned according to) semantic strength. Assuming that
all scales can be construed as discrete for the purposes of the Maximality Condition,
this explains -wa’s potential to obviate Negative Islands in degree questions.
4.2.1 Deriving alternatives: numerals and Horn scales
In a standard view, one way of deriving alternatives consists in replacing an element
of a so-called Horn scale with one of its scale mates. Numerals are usually taken to
form a Horn scale. If so, we can obtain alternatives for (7) by replacing too ‘ten’
with other numerals. For each numeral on the Horn scale, there is one logical form
isomorphic to the logical form of (7). Collecting the propositions expressed by all of
these logical forms, we arrive at the set of propositions in (43a).
(43) a. {Taro stayed in Germany for n days or more: n is a numeral}
b. Taro stayed in Germany for 11 days or more [ALT2 (7)]
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The proposition in (43b) is one of the elements of (43a). And, of course, taking
duration of stay in Germany to be measured in full days, (43b) is equivalent to (35a)
above, one of the alternative propositions we seek to account for.
Much the same applies to (25). The Horn scales of numerals generates the
set of alternative propositions in (44a), which has the proposition (44b) as one of
its elements; and under our assumption about measuring length of stay, (44b) is
equivalent to the intended alternative in (37a).
(44) a. {everyone stayed in Germany for n days or more: n is a numeral}
b. everyone stayed in Germany for 11 days or more [ALT2 (25)]
4.2.2 Deriving alternatives: the role of wa
The remaining task is to account for the exactly alternatives in (31a) and (33a) above.
We propose that these alternative propositions are due to logical forms just like those
for (7) and (25) except that -wa is omitted. As before, we take the logical forms of
(7) and (25) to feature an (unpronounced) gradable predicate. We now assume that
-wa is an optional modifier of such gradable predicates. Departing from our earlier
assumption, suppose moreover that unmodified degree predicates have an exactly
semantics, rather than the more standard at least semantics illustrated in (15). Our
revised lexical entry for nagaku ‘long’ is then as shown in (45).
(45) JnagakuK = λd.λe.λw.e′s duration in w = d
In order for this lexical entry to have the intended effect, we need to make
certain assumptions about the semantic composition of the relevant logical forms.
Specifically, we need to assume that the external argument of the degree predicate
is maximized in a sense familiar from e.g. Landman 2004. In the case of (7), this
means that the eventuality argument of nagaku is the maximal past state of Taro’s
staying in Germany. Similarly, in the case of (25) it means that for each individual in
the domain of the universal subject, the degree predicate is applied to the maximal
past state of that individual’s staying in Germany. This accounts for the intended
exactly alternatives: under the lexical entry in (45), the resulting interpretations for
(7) and (25), shown in (46) and (47), respectively, are accurately paraphrased by
(31a) and (33a) above.
(46) λw.JnagakuK(10 days)
(max{e : e is past state of Taro staying in Germany})(w) [ALT1 (7)]
(47) λw. for every person x : JnagakuK(10 days)
(max{e : e is past state of x staying in Germany})(w) [ALT1 (25)]
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We take modification of a lexical gradable predicate by -wa to result in a new
gradable predicate with an at least semantics. So, as shown in (48), we assign to
nagaku wa the interpretation previously given to unmodified nagaku (cf. (15)).
(48) Jnagaku waK = λd.λe.λw.e′s duration in w≥ d
Assuming that states of stay in Germany are maximized as before, (7) and (25) are
predicted to express the propositions in (49) and (50), respectively. As intended,
these are correctly paraphrased by the bracketed statements in (30) and (32).
(49) λw. Jnagaku waK(10 days)
(max{e : e is past state of Taro staying in Germany})(w) [ASN (7)]
(50) λw. for every person x : Jnagaku waK(10 days)
(max{e : e is past state of x staying in Germany})(w) [ASN (25)]
4.2.3 Back to degree questions and Negative Islands
We are now ready to revisit the data pattern in (3) to (5), repeated in (51) to (53).
The first task is to demonstrate that (51) and (53) satisfy the Maximality Condition
in (12), while (52) violates it.
(51) Taro-wa
Taro-TOP
doitu-ni
Germany-in
doredake
how
nagaku
long
taizaisimasi-ta
stay-PAST
ka?
Q
‘How long did Taro stay in Germany?’
(52) * Taro-wa
Taro-TOP
doitu-ni
Germany-in
doredake
how
nagaku
long
taizaisimas-en-desi-ta
stay-not-COP-PAST
ka?
Q
(53) Taro-wa
Taro-TOP
doitu-ni
Germany-in
doredake
how
nagaku-wa
long-WA
taizaisimas-en-desi-ta
stay-not-COP-PAST
ka?
Q
Under present assumptions, the degree property and Hamblin set for (51) are as
shown in (54). (54a) is neither downward nor upward scalar. In fact, the elements
of (54b) are mutually inconsistent, so the set contains at most one true proposition.
Suppose now that Taro stayed in Germany for, say, exactly ten days. In that case,
the proposition that (54a) maps ten days to is the one and only, hence the most
informative, true proposition in (54b). So the Maximality Condition is met.
(54) a. λd : d is a duration. that Taro stayed exactly d long in Germany
b. {that Taro stayed exactly d long in Germany: d is a duration}
The degree property and Hamblin set for (52) are shown in (55). (55a) too is
neither upward nor downward scalar, but in contrast to (54b), (55b) contains at most
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one false element. In the scenario under consideration, this is the proposition that
Taro did not stay for exactly ten days. All the other propositions in the Hamblin set
are true, and since they are not related by entailment, none of them can be the most
informative. So, as intended, the Maximality Condition is violated.
(55) a. λd : d is a duration. that Taro did not stay exactly d long in Germany
b. {that Taro did not stay exactly d long in Germany: d is a duration}
The idea that an exactly semantics for gradable predicates could be behind the
Negative Island effect in English degree questions is contemplated, though dismissed
in the end, in Abrusán 2007. Abrusán moreover observes that such an analysis would
be able to accommodate the phenomenon of modal obviation (see section 3.2).11
We are the first, however, to exploit an exactly semantics in tying together epistemic
implications and Negative Island obviation.
To see how, consider the degree property and Hamblin set for (53) in (56). Note
that these are familiar from section 2 (see (10)), where we took lexical gradable
predicates to have an at least semantics.
(56) a. λd : d is a duration. that Taro did not stay d long (or longer) in Germany
b. {that Taro did not stay d long (or longer) in Germany: d is a duration}
The key observation is that, in contrast to (54b) and (55b), the elements of
(56b) are related by, or aligned according to, semantic strength. Specifically, as
we mentioned section in 2, (56a) is downward scalar. It is now enough to repeat
observations from section 2. If length of stay is counted in full days only, the set of
degrees that (56a) describes has a minimum. For example, if the length of Taro’s
stay is exactly ten days, then eleven days will be the minimal duration that (56a)
maps to a true proposition, and the proposition that Taro did not stay for eleven days
(or longer) is the most informative true element of (56b). The Maximality Condition
is met, and this completes our account of the paradigm in (51) to (53).
Evidently, this account requires that, for the analysis of Japanese, we reject
Fox & Hackl’s (2006) hypothesis that all scales are dense for the purposes of the
Maximality Condition. We must assume that the Maximality Condition after all has
access to contextual information, such as the assumption that duration of stay in
Germany is counted in full days only. In fact, since -wa obviates Negative Islands
even in cases where the density assumption seems fairly plausible, such as the
11 Fox (2007b) explains the general principle behind this observation, showing that wide scope necessity
modals are predicted to obviate any violations of the Maximality Condition, whether or not they are
related to scale density. In the case at hand, obviation by a higher epistemic necessity modal, as in
(21), can be credited to the fact that it is logically possible for there to be a unique duration r such
that the speaker is certain that Taro did not stay exactly r long in Germany.
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Japanese counterpart of How tall isn’t Taro?, we have to assume that the Maximality
Condition allows for accommodation of discrete units of measurement in contexts
that do not themselves make such discrete units salient. We have to leave to future
work the task of resolving the obvious tension between this conclusion and Fox &
Hackl’s (2006) analysis of Negative Islands (and related phenomena) in English.
5 Concluding remarks
One way of resolving the tension referred to in the last paragraph is to identify
problems afflicting the scale alignment analysis that would clearly offset its success
in tying together obviation by -wa and ignorance implications. We actually think
that, unfortunately, this line of attack has some promise. We are aware of two
potential weaknesses of (the current version of) our scale alignment analysis. First,
it is not clear that ignorance implications and obviation by -wa are limited to what
we have called degree related -wa; so our scale alignment account may at least have
to be generalized in non-trivial ways. Second, we have limited confidence in our
assumption that all lexical gradable predicates in Japanese have an exactly semantics;
it certainly remains to be seen whether this assumption is consistent with speaker
intuitions on a wider range of cases.
Lack of space prevents us from elaborating on these points, but we hope to
pursue these issues in future work. We also plan to take up the important task of
connecting the analysis of Negative Island obviation to previous literature on -wa,
especially Hara 2006 and Tomioka 2009. While these authors are not concerned with
degree questions, they discuss epistemic effects contributed by -wa which are bound
to be closely related to the possibility implications that have figured prominently in
this paper.
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